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The purpose of the thesis is finding of an effective instrument of defining the scope of 
liability for breach of EU competition law and the actual definition of the scope of 
liability. In particular, the thesis aims to prove that, contrary to the prevailing view, 
only direct victims of violation of EU competition rules should be compensated. The 
thesis is divided into four chapters; the first being devoted to the general methodology 
of the thesis, private and public enforcement of competition law and to the claim for 
damages under the EU law. The analysis of private and public enforcement of 
competition law is an important basis for the whole thesis. The question to which 
extent the damages claim are important for the enforcement of competition law 
determines the function of damages claims in the area of competition law. The thesis 
arrives at the belief that private enforcement is not the main tool fir the enforcement 
of EU competition law. However, it is a very important tool.
The following chapter focuses generally on damages claims in the area of competition 
law (the foundation of the claim for breach of competition law, of the claim for 
breach for unfair competition law and of the claim for breach of morality). Further, 
this chapter analysis the main functions of tort law: compensation, prevention, 
sanction and formation of law by courts. The choice of the function influences the 
construction of the damages claims, in particular the prerequisites for liability and the 
scope of liability. The previous chapter observed that the damages claims are an 
important instrument of EU competition law enforcement. For this reason, the thesis
notes that from the viewpoint of the EU the main function in this case is prevention.
Prevention expects a broader scope of liability than the compensatory function. 
However, the thesis point out that the compensatory function should never be 
forgotten and prefers this function to prevention.
The core chapter of the thesis is the third chapter on the scope of liability. This 
chapter compares on the basis of comparative method two instruments of determining 
the scope of liability for damage caused: adequacy, which is the main instrument in 
the Czech legal system, and protective scope, which is inherent to the German and 
Austrian legal system. Between those two instruments the thesis seeks for the more 
effective. Effective in the meaning of more reasonable, fair for both parties involved 
(victim and tortfeasor) and with a foreseeable result. The reference legal systems are 
Czech, German and Austrian legal system.
It cannot be said that adequacy – working on the basis of foreseeability and 
probability of damage – doesn’t limit the scope of liability at all. However, in the case 
of competition damage the application of adequacy doesn’t lead to a fair or effective 
result. It can be claimed that the more the damage is remote, the less it will be 
successful in claim through natural selection. The more remote the damage is, the 
more difficult it is for the victim to prove the causal link between the loss and the 
forbidden anticompetitive act. At the same time, it can be claimed the more remote 
the damage will be, the more scattered it will be, i.e. its amount will probably be for 
each individual relatively low. A small damage is a very weak motivator for the 
demand of damages there, were the demand is connected with relatively high costs (in 
comparison with the loss).
The reliance on natural selection is not fair in the broad meaning of legal justice 
founded on certain rules like legal certainty. The tortfeasor cannot rely on where the 
scope of his liability will end, which can be problematic especially where the extent 
of fines and disgorgement of illegal gains is connected to the probable amount of the 
damages award. From this point of view, it can be claimed that the application of 
other mechanisms of defining the scope of liability seems to be convenient, as is e.g. 
the protective scope of the norm, which defines the extent of liability more clearly.
The second part of the chapter analysis the second instrument under scrutiny, i.e. the 
protective scope of the norm. The method of defining the protective scope is finding 
the personal, material and functional area of protection. These three views stem from 
three prerequisites: The tortfeasor is obliged to compensate only the person, whose 
protection the breached norm is aiming at. The breached has to be set up to protect the 
legal interest that has been interfered with. Further, the legal interest has to be 
interfered with in a way that should have been prevented by the norm. This means 
that compensated should be those persons that the author of arts. 101/102 TFEU 
meant to protect. Based on this method of definition, the legitimate claimants can be 
determined: cartel members, competitor, direct purchaser/supplier-entrepreneur, direct 
purchaser-consumer and indirect purchaser. The indirect purchaser, i.e. the indirect 
victim cannot be under the general principles of tort law authorised to claim damages. 
However, as the preventive function of tort claims is prioritized in the EU law the 
prevailing view is that indirect purchaser should be authorised to damages claims. The 
thesis, however, comes to the belief consistent with the prioritization of the 
compensation function that the general principles of tort law shouldn’t be violated and 
that for the compensation of indirect victims the legal systems know other means. In 
the case of extremely audacious conduct towards consumers the claim for breach of 
good morals can be used.
The fight against bad competition habits can be won with other means. But these 
means lie within the sphere of the European Commission and national competition 
authorities, not within the sphere of individuals. The preventive effect of damages 
claims can be considered as a welcomed secondary effect but not as the main 
objective of a tortious claim. Compensable should be only the damage and authorised 
should be only the person whose characteristics correspond to the classic tort law 
principles. We shouldn’t be looking for new groups of authorised persons for the only 
reason that we need stronger weapons against anticompetitive conduct. The question 
who should be authorised to claim has to be considered very carefully.
When comparing the results of application of adequacy and of protective purpose, it 
has to be decidedly stated that for the area of competition damage effective result 
cannot be reached if adequacy is applied.
Adequacy on its own does not reply to the question of general determination who 
should be authorised to claim competition damages. While applying specific 
criterions that should be applied on entrepreneurs (competitors), one can expect that 
the group of authorised victims can be defined very broadly. Adequacy on its own 
cannot exclude other than pecuniary loss. The courts have to apply other undeclared 
considerations of justice. In particular, adequacy is not able to give certain limits to 
liability in advance and in this way to reply to the needs of legal certainty. When 
applying adequacy the scope of liability is rather unclear. This lack of clarity may 
have negative effects on judges in uncommon areas of law (as are competition losses 
nowadays). This can lead to the results that out of fear of limitless liability the judges 
will set the limits of liability too narrowly. In this way even authorised victims might 
be deterred from claiming for damages which would set back as well the wished for 
function of prevention of violating the EU competition rules.
The definition of the scope of liability with the help of the protective purpose of the 
norm gives a much more clear and accurate reply. Further, it defines the scope in an 
abstract way in advance. Thus, it is clear from the beginning which losses can be 
claimed for and which are not compensable. In this way, it has as well positive effects 
on potential claimants and makes the enforcement process more effective. The 
protective purpose gives generally a narrower definition of the group of authorised 
person. However, this depends rather on the legal-political setting of the instrument. 
The moving of the limits in this or the other direction depending on political views in 
the time can be considered.
On the personal level, the protective purpose of the norm gives a clearer and narrower 
definition of authorised person (especially it is able to determine specific groups of 
authorised victims), which is more endurable for the whole system, from the 
economic point of view in particular. On the material level, it ensures that only those 
interesest will be compensated that are in the area of the activity of the violated norm. 
Other losses belong to the general live risk.
The final chapter analyses the conclusions of the performed examination a states that 
the original goal of proving that excluding claims of indirect victim is the only correct 
way was not entirely reached. It has been discovered that there are exceptions where 
the claims of indirect victims can be accepted. These exceptions should be, however, 
held in the limits where they are now. Further, it could be considered whether not to 
limit the liability to the first and second chain link or a specific way of interlinking of 
the victims by means of legislative acts. Such a limitation to specific indirect victims 
cannot be reached only by means of protective purpose or adequacy. These 
instruments cannot in a generally abstract way say, which indirect victims can claim 
and which not. Leaving this question to decisions in concreto could undermine the 
principle of legal certainty.
The question of how to define the scope of liability, especially on the personal level, 
depends of course as well on the function that is connected to the damages claim. If it 
is prevention and deterrence, then the scope of liability should be as broad as possible. 
This is however not the primary function of tort law. The main objective is reasonable 
and just allocation of losses. The original principle is casum sentit dominus. Only if a 
specific reason is given the loss can be attributed to someone else. Some losses are a 
common result of interaction between individuals, which have to be expected. These 
losses shouldn’t be subject to damages.
The protective purpose is not only mean how to define the scope of liability. The fact 
that neither adequacy nor the protective scope are enough as instruments of limiting 
the liability is proven by the two big European codification projects: Principles of 
European Tort Law (PETL) a Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). The 
PETLs name in the art. 3:201 (Scope of liability) next to the foreseeability (adequacy) 
and protective purpose of the norm other factors that have to be considered 
cumulatively while defining the scope of liability of the tortfeasor: he nature and the 
value of the protected interest, basis of liability (fault, breach of a standard of conduct, 
breach of a special obligation to protect other against damage) and ordinary risks of 
life. The DCFR limits the liability in its art. VI.-1:101 only to legally relevant 
damage. This legally relevant damage is given only if an interest has been violated 
that the law is specifically protecting or if this interest is worth of being protected by 
the law (art. VI.-2:101). incl. a clear statement of cases when indirect/secondary 
victims have a compensable damage (e.g. art. VI.-2:202).
The Czech legal system does not include such a detailed definition, however the 
construction of tortious liability does not prevent the Czech courts from using 
interpretation rules that would correspond to these principles.
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